

AIR

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EGFA- 1092

15-15

Chief, EE

Chief, FHB

APR 16 1953

INFO: COM, Frankfurt

Operational/CALL

Phase Out of KIBITZ-15 Network; Preparatory Step to
Removing KIBITZ-15 From REDCAP Operations

REF : (1) DIR 49485, 10 April 1953
(2) EGQW-5711, 27 March 1953
(3) EGFA-1054, 7 April 1953
(4) SFRAN 3813, 14 April 1953

SYNOPSIS: KIBITZ-15 was told on 13 April that all of his former Stay-Behind net was to be closed out, and arrangements were made for him, KIBITZ-150, [] and [] to meet on 15 April to agree on final details of the close out. KIBITZ-15 was further advised to suspend until 8 May, any additional activity in the REDCAP field. In May, we will advise him of our decision to discontinue the operation.

1. After receipt of Ref. 1, the undersigned reviewed the entire problem of the KIBITZ-15 network and KIBITZ-15's activities with []. It was clear:

- a. Decision to sever all contact with KIBITZ-15 mitigated against continuation of five compartmented teams (Annex 1, EGFA-934) of KIBITZ-15 net. Saving these teams had been predicated on assumption of Headquarters approval of use of KIBITZ-150 as Stay-Behind Principal Agent, with KIBITZ-15 having no part in the operation but nevertheless having lent his moral support,
- b. Since KIBITZ-15 was given the green light to go ahead with REDCAP activities on 2 April (Ref. 3), complete termination at the 13 April contact might well have disastrous results. The break, when made, must be clear and logical enough for KIBITZ-15 to accept.

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2. Accordingly, it was decided:

- a. To notify KIBITZ-15 that we were closing out the entire Stay-Behind net,
- b. To tell him implications of the current Soviet peace offensive had not yet been fully analysed, so his efforts in the inducement field must be suspended until May. (In May we will advise him that high policy requires we cease these efforts.)

3. Contact was made at 1500 hours, 13 April, as arranged. As usual [] accompanied []. The Agent said at the outset he was meeting Identity 337 at 1900 hours in Karlsruhe to get a report on the latter's Berlin trip, so we postponed discussion of REDCAP topics until a second meeting at 2100 hours.

4. Continuing the first meeting, we told KIBITZ-15 that the political development in Germany had progressed to the point where the Americans could no longer afford to be associated directly with this (Stay-Behind) mechanism. It had been decided to close out all of the teams in the net he had organized. Any person who had had any contact with American personnel must be questioned by the American officers concerned (debriefing), final financial details adjusted, and a statement to forever keep all details of the work secret (quit claim) signed by team members. Although we had told him previously to dissociate himself completely from (Stay-Behind) personnel, in order to speedily complete the phase out, he should now work directly with the (case officer) in those instances where team members were unknown to KIBITZ-150. He agreed.

5. A specific phase out plan is now being drawn up by [] and [] and will be forwarded in a day or so after approval by COM. [], [], KIBITZ-15 and KIBITZ-150 are meeting on 15 April to lay the groundwork for the close out. We estimate about four weeks will be required, but presume you will still want to ask for a three-month extension (Ref. 1) of the KIBITZ-15 project to provide for any unexpected developments.

6. Frankly we now see no further use for KIBITZ-150 after he has assisted in the termination of the project. His private employment is shaky at the moment, largely because of neglecting his job in working for us, and some substantial settlement on him probably must be made. Specific proposals will be advanced by [] and [].

Ref. 2?

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7. At the second meeting at 2100 hours, KIBITZ-15 reported enthusiastically on 337's trip to Berlin. While there, 337 contacted Identity 339 in West Berlin, and Identity 340 in East Berlin along with Selma Szyszynski nee Döring, Berlin No. 18, Lenin Allee 164 (not listed on Enc. to EGFA-974). Like 339 and 340, Szyszynski is a nurse. On the basis of representing an unspecified German organization, 337 told 339 and Szyszynski at separate meetings that he would like to establish contact with Soviet officers who had an understanding of the West and a desire for West-East cooperation. Both girls said they had encountered such people in their professional capacity, and both added, inter alia, that a number of Soviet officers would join the West if it were not for the fear of being returned after making the break. 337 told the nurses that he would be returning to Berlin in about four weeks. He arranged a simple code, tied in with his part-purchasing mission to Berlin, to have the nurses inform him of any interim contact with Soviet officers with Western inclinations. Personalities are available on all three nurses but will not be forwarded since the project is ending.

8. I then made my pitch to KIBITZ-15 about the Soviet peace offensive, and told him to suspend all operations until 8 May, when we would have a complete analysis of Soviet intentions to guide our future actions. By exercising a remarkable degree of self-control he managed to accept this, but proposed that surely I had no intention of having him attempt to now halt the nurses' actions in Berlin-- "which could not be stepped in any event". I replied that we had no such intention, but that we expected him to start nothing else during the intervening period, that we felt he would be quite busy in the next three or four weeks in assisting the close out of his old net, and that he should get in touch with me (through the emergency Heidelberg contact) prior to 8 May only in the event that one of the nurses encountered a Soviet who wanted to defect.

9. At the 8 May meeting, scheduled in Mannheim, I expect to announce our intention to withdraw from the field. One or two additional meetings may be necessary to wind up final administrative and financial details, but we shall try to avoid them if possible.

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